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Notes
Inequitable Sentencing for Possession of Child
Pornography: A Failure To Distinguish
Voyeurs from Pederasts
JESSE P. BASBAUM*
This Note identifies several infirmities of United States Sentencing Guideline section
2 G2.2, the sentencing scheme for possession of child pornography. The production and
web-based dissemination of child pornography images has increased substantially over
the past decade. The Department of Justice has aggressively prosecuted these crimes
under the rationale that (r) possession of child pornography leads to contact offenses,
(2) demand drives supply, and (3) the mere availability of an image or video constitutes
continued and indirect abuse of the child depicted. In light of these and other concerns,
Congress has enacted dramatic increases in the potential sentences for possessors of
child pornography. In this Note, I argue that the Sentencing Commission should
amend the guidelines for possession of child pornography because empirical evidence
calls into question the asserted link between possession of child pornography and
future sexual assaults of children. Moreover, the guidelines fail to consider the nature
of internet downloading, and thus most of the "enhancements" are actually a core facet
of basic possession. Numerous federal district courts have taken note of these
deficiencies and have sentenced defendants below the applicable guideline ranges.
Though the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Rita and Kimbrough permit trial
courts to disregard sentencing guidelines that lack empirical support, most courts still
rely heavily on the guidelines to impose lengthy sentences. Accordingly, I propose that
the Sentencing Commission amend section 2 G2.2 in a manner that reflects the tenuous
connection between possession and contact offenses, as well as the realities of internet
use.
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2olo; B.A., Biology,
Oberlin College, 2001. The Author would like to thank Amy Baron-Evans, George Bisharat, Geoffrey
Hansen, Aaron Rappaport, and Troy Stabenow. The subtitle of this Note was inspired by Judge Jack
Weinstein's opinion in United States v. Palazzo, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308,365 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
[1281]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION...............................................1282
I. CONSTITUTIONAL AND NORMATIVE BASES OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
LAW............................................ 
..... 1284
II. HISTORY AND APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES SENTENCING
GUIDELINE SECTION 2G2.2 .................................. 1286
A. THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES...... ..... 1287
B. EVOLUTION OF UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINE
SECTION 2G2.2 ........................... ........... 1289
III. THE MORAL PANIC VERSUS THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ..................... 1292
A. THE MORAL PANIC OVER CHILD PORNOGRAPHY..............1292
B. ONLINE TO OFFLINE OFFENSE "CROSS OVER"..........1294
C. INTERNET USE ........................................1298
i. The Distribution Enhancement......... ........ 1....I298
2. The Number-of-Images Enhancements....... ....... 1300
IV. INITIAL MOVEMENT TOWARD REFORM ..................... ......1302
CONCLUSION.............I......o4..... ........................... 1304
INTRODUCTION
On January 25, 201o, Thomas Cunningham was sentenced to just
over ten years in prison for possession of child pornography.'
Cunningham, who was fifty-four years old at the time, had no criminal
history.2 He pled guilty to possessing 144 images and one video.3 The
mandatory minimum sentence for Cunningham's crime was five years in
prison. But he was sentenced to over ten years as a result of numerous
sentencing enhancements that significantly increased his recommended
sentence. He received enhancements because some of the images
depicted prepubescent minors and because others depicted sadistic
behavior.4 He received additional enhancements for using a computer to
obtain the material,5 and for possessing a significant number of images
and videos.6 He also received an enhancement for distributing some of
i. United States v. Cunningham, No. i:o9CRI54, 200 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6097, at *1-2 (N.D.
Ohio Jan. 26, 2010).
2. Id. at *30, 33.
3. Id. at *26.
4. Id. at *3-4-
5. Id. at *4-
6. Id.
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the material.? These enhancements more than doubled Cunningham's
sentence.8
There is no question that Cunningham's conduct was reprehensible
and deserving of severe punishment.? The question posed in this Note is,
how severe? This Note argues that the sentencing guidelines for
possession of child pornography, and specifically certain enhancements
like those applied to Cunningham's case, should be amended. A
comparison between sentencing for possession of child pornography and
sentencing for actual child molestation underscores the need for reform.
A hypothetical adult defendant who uses the internet to lure a twelve-
year-old girl into having repeated sex with him would face a lower
recommended sentence than did Mr. Cunningham.0
The statutory provision that underlies this inequity is United States
Sentencing Guideline section 2G2.2, which applies to receipt and
possession of child pornography." This provision has received little
attention in the legal academy. A small number of commentators have
attacked these guidelines as being driven by politics rather than empirical
evidence," but few have actually explored the empirical evidence itself.'
Part I of this Note describes the historical development and primary
rationales for laws proscribing possession of child pornography. Part II
provides a brief description of the United States Sentencing
Commission's role in promulgating advisory sentencing guidelines, and
then discusses the procedural defects and political distortions that led to
the creation of section 2G2.2. Part III surveys existing empirical studies
that undermine one of the primary rationales behind strict sentencing in
this area-that possession offenses lead to future contact offenses.
Part III also examines specific internet-related enhancements under
section 2G2.2, and it argues that several of them are based on a
fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of internet use. Lastly, Part
IV discusses the growing number of sentencing decisions that have
7. Id. at *3-
8. Cunningham was sentenced at the low end of the recommended sentencing range for his
offense. The high end was 151 months (over twelve-and-a-half years). Id. at *4.
9. There are several extremely disturbing facets of Cunningham's case. For example, the
sentencing court was particularly troubled by the fact that Cunningham videotaped himself
masturbating onto the photograph of a toddler. Id. at *39-4o. The videotape shows Cunningham
talking to the photo and telling the girl how her father wants Cunningham to rape her. Id.
io. See infra notes 88-9o and accompanying text.
II. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (2009).
12. See infra notes 91-1oo and accompanying text.
13. As this Note reached its final stages of publication, Professor Carissa Hessick posted an
excellent article that includes a critique of various rationales behind strict sentencing for child
pornography offenses. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Disentangling Child Pornography frorn Child Sex
Abuse, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2olo), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractjid-157796r. In addition to reviewing relevant empirical studies, Hessick has also
proposed several sensible areas for reform. Id.
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disregarded the guideline recommendations based on a finding that the
guidelines were unreasonable. Part IV also reviews recent signs that the
Sentencing Commission may be considering amendments to section
2G2.2.
This Note concludes by arguing that the Sentencing Commission
should make substantial amendments to the guidelines. Sentencing for
child pornography should be recalibrated to reflect the actual risk of
cross over from online to offline offending. The new scheme should also
incorporate a realistic understanding of how file-sharing works, and it
should take account of evolving technology that permits defendants to
download massive numbers of images with little effort or even intent.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL AND NORMATIVE BASES OF
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW
This Part surveys the development of child pornography
proscriptions in the context of free speech challenges under the First
Amendment. The discussion illuminates the primary rationales used by
legislators and other advocates of lengthy sentences for possessors of
child pornography.
Child pornography is not protected under the First Amendment. In
New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court found that prohibitions against
the distribution of child pornography, unlike similar prohibitions against
adult pornography, do not impinge on the right to free expression. 4 The
defendant in Ferber was convicted under a New York statute for selling
films depicting young boys masturbating." The defendant challenged the
statute on the grounds that it infringed his free speech rights.6 But the
Court disagreed, articulating five primary reasons why states could
proscribe the distribution of child pornography without running afoul of
the First Amendment: (i) states have a compelling interest in
"safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor";' (2)
states can criminalize distribution of child pornography because it is an
effective means of eliminating the market for such material;" (3) the
distribution of child pornography is an integral part of its actual
production, which itself is proscribed because it involves the sexual abuse
of minors; (4) the societal value of child pornography is "exceedingly
modest, if not de minimis";20 and (5) child pornography, as an entire
category of speech, can be deemed outside the protection of the First
14. 458 U.S.747, 774 (1982).
15. Id. at 752.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 756-57.
19. Id. at 765-62.
20. Id. at 762.
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Amendment because "the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly
outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process of
case-by-case adjudication is required."2'
Having upheld the constitutionality of prohibitions on distribution
of child pornography, the Court then confronted the question of whether
mere possession of child pornography could also be proscribed. In
Osborne v. Ohio, the Court relied on the rationales enunciated in Ferber
and held that an Ohio statute criminalizing the possession of child
pornography did not violate the First Amendment." The Osborne Court
noted that child pornography constitutes a permanent record of the
victim's abuse, and it found persuasive certain evidence indicating that
"pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other children into sexual
activity."23 The Osborne Court used these and other rationales to
distinguish possession of child pornography from possession of obscenity
involving adult actors, which it had earlier held could not be proscribed.24
The Supreme Court next considered whether laws criminalizing the
distribution of virtual child pornography violated the First Amendment.
Virtual child pornography includes either pictures of youthful-looking
adults or computer-generated images of children." In Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition, the Court found such laws unconstitutional, in part
because the Ferber rationales did not apply.26 Since no actual abuse of
minors was involved, the prohibition would not help dry up a market that
depended on unlawful conduct." Similarly, there was no parallel concern
regarding a "permanent record" of a victim's abuse.' Moreover, the
Government attempted, but ultimately failed, to convince the Court that
"pedophiles may use virtual child pornography to seduce children."2 9
Having found that adults had a First Amendment right to possess virtual
child pornography, the Court found that the government could not
proscribe such possession merely because of the risk that it might be
misused.30
The Ashcroft Court also rejected the contention that virtual child
pornography could be criminalized because it "whets the appetites of
pedophiles and encourages them to engage in illegal conduct."3' The
21. Id. at 763-64.
22. 495 U.S. 103, 110-I1 (1989).
23. Id. at ii i.
24. Id. at lo8 (distinguishing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969) ("[T]he mere private
possession of obscene matter cannot constitutionally be made a crime.")).
25. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 239-40 (2002).
26. Id. at 240, 256.
27. See id. at 249-50.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 251-52.
30. Id. at 252-53.
31. Id. at 253.
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Court characterized this rationale as a forbidden attempt to
"constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a
person's private thoughts."32 Unless the Government could show a
stronger connection between the speech at issue and actual child abuse,
the Court held that the Government could "not prohibit speech on the
ground that it may encourage pedophiles to engage in illegal conduct."33
The preceding description of the Supreme Court's treatment of
child pornography illuminates several rationales for proscribing the
possession of such material. Many of these same arguments are made by
those who advocate for lengthy sentences for possessors of child
pornography. First, advocates frequently argue that restricting possession
of child pornography reduces the demand for such material, which in
turn would reduce the amount of sexual abuse of children.' Second,
many believe that possession of child pornography leads to actual
physical abuse of children.35 This rationale is based in part on the belief
that child pornography "whets the appetites" of pedophiles, and in part
on the contention that pedophiles use illicit images to entice children into
participating in illicit acts.36 This "cross-over" theory is sometimes based
on the premise that possession of child pornography encourages
pedophiles to commit contact offenses because the images "normalize"
such abuse.37 Third, proponents of strict sentences sometimes argue that
possession is not a "victimless" crime, since the existence of the image
constitutes a permanent record of the child's abuse, and each viewing of
the image is akin to another episode of abuse. 8
II. HISTORY AND APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES SENTENCING
GUIDELINE SECTION 2G2.2
The preceding Part discussed the history and rationales behind child
pornography law. Many of those rationales are also invoked by those
32. Id. (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969)).
33. Id. at 253-54. In response to the Ashcroft decision, Congress amended the virtual child
pornography statute to specifically prohibit "pandering or solicitation" of virtual child pornography.
See United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1835 (2oo8). The Supreme Court found this facet of the
statute constitutional, because the provision at issue did not target the underlying material, but only
"the collateral speech that introduces such material into the child-pornography distribution network."
Id. at 1838-39. Since the provision was designed to apply only when the alleged panderer or solicitor
actually believed that the material would depict real children, Ferber did not render the provision
unconstitutional. Id. at 1840.
34. See, e.g., Alexandra Gelber, Assistant Deputy Chief, Child Exploitation & Obscenity Section,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Response to "A Reluctant Rebellion" 4 (July 1, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/ceos/ReluctantRebellionResponse.pdf.
35. See, e.g., sources cited infra note 104.
36. See, e.g., Ashcroft, 53 U.S. at 253.
37. See, e.g., Anthony R. Beech et al., The Internet and Child Sexual Offending: A Criminological
Review, 13 AGGREssION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 216, 222 (2oo8).
38. Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography's Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L. REV. 847, 852-54 (2008).
I286 [Vol. 61:I1281
DISTINGUISHING VOYEURS FROM PEDERASTS
who support strict sentencing for possession of child pornography. This
Part discusses the evolution of the child pornography sentencing
guidelines, and describes how the legislators who crafted those guidelines
were motivated by moral indignation rather than empirical evidence.
A. THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The United States Sentencing Guidelines are promulgated pursuant
to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA).39 The purpose of the SRA
was to limit disparities in sentencing that arose from the unchecked
powers given to sentencing judges.40 The pre-SRA system, known as
"indeterminate sentencing," was problematic because similarly situated
defendants were receiving vastly different sentences. 4' The SRA sought
to remedy this problem by establishing the United States Sentencing
Commission, which promulgates guidelines meant to restrict the latitude
exercised by sentencing judges.42 The ranges are derived from a complex
two-dimensional grid that includes forty-three "offense levels" and six
"criminal history" categories.43 The offense level-a measurement of the
seriousness of the crime-is determined by various factors including, for
example, how the crime was committed, the status of the victim, and the
defendant's acceptance of responsibility." The guidelines then specify a
sentencing range for any given offense level and criminal history
combination.45 The SRA made the guidelines binding on sentencing
judges, although judges could depart from the guidelines on a finding of
certain aggravating or mitigating circumstances.46
For more than twenty years, federal sentencing was conducted
under the SRA's mandatory guideline regime. But in United States v.
Booker, the Supreme Court struck down the portion of the SRA that
made the guidelines binding, finding that it violated defendants' Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial.47 The Booker Court found that
mandatory sentencing guidelines were unconstitutional because they
permitted judges to sentence above the statutory maximum if they found
certain facts to be true by a preponderance of the evidence." Relying on
its earlier decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court reaffirmed that
39. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 362 (1988).
40. See id. at 364-66; see also STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTARY 1471-79 (7th ed. 2004).
41. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363-66.
42. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991,994, 995(a)(I) (2oo6); see also Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367.
43. Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural
Analysis, 1o5 COLUM. L. REv. 1315, 1324-25 (2005).
44. Id. at 1325.
45. Id. at 1326.
46. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367-68 (citing x8 U.S.C. § 3553(a)-(c)).
47. 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
48. Id. at 232.
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the Sixth Amendment requires that any fact that increases the
defendant's punishment above the statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.49 But rather
than striking down the entire SRA, the Court simply made the guidelines
advisory rather than mandatory. 0
The Supreme Court recently explained that the guidelines, in their
newly advisory role, "should be the starting point and the initial
benchmark" for any sentencing determination." But the Court has also
made clear that the guidelines are one of several factors a sentencing
judge should consider.52 The other sentencing factors are outlined in
18 U.S.C. § 3553, which commands a sentencing judge to "impose a
sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary," to comply with four
primary needs: (i) that the sentence reflect the "seriousness of the
offense," "promote respect for the law," and "provide just punishment";
(2) that the sentence "afford adequate deterrence" against the type of
conduct in question; (3) that the sentence "protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant"; and (4) that the sentence "provide the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care,
or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.""
The Court has also clarified important issues related to the appellate
standard of review for sentencing cases. In Rita v. United States, the
Court found that an appellate court may apply a presumption of
reasonableness when reviewing a sentence that falls within the
guidelines.54 The Court then clarified, in Gall v. United States, the
appellate standard of review when the district court has sentenced a
defendant below the guideline range." The Court found that a sentencing
judge need not specify "extraordinary" circumstances when sentencing
below the recommended guideline range. 6 Instead, appellate courts
should apply an "abuse-of-discretion standard" when reviewing
sentences that fall above or below the guideline range.57
The most significant recent sentencing case involved the guidelines
for possession of crack cocaine. In Kimbrough v. United States, the
sentencing judge declined to follow the recommendation of between 228
and 270 months, and instead sentenced the defendant to 18o months in
prison." The judge based this variance in part on the fact that the
49. Id. at 230-32 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).
5o. Id. at 245.
51. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).
52. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347-48 (2007).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D) (2oo6).
54. See 55' U.S. at 347,351-
55. 552 U.S. 38.
56. Id. at 47.
57. ld. atg5.
58. 552 U.S. 85, 93 (2007).
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applicable guidelines treated every gram of crack cocaine as equivalent
to one hundred grams of powder cocaine.59 The Supreme Court upheld
the sentence, finding that the crack cocaine guidelines "do not exemplify
the Commission's exercise of its characteristic institutional role"
because they were not based on "empirical data and national
experience."" It was therefore not an abuse of discretion for the district
court to sentence the defendant below the guidelines.6 As discussed in
Part IV below, an increasing number of district courts have recently
relied on Kimbrough when sentencing child pornography defendants
below the range recommended by the guidelines.6
In sum, Booker and its progeny have given district courts some
latitude to depart from guidelines such as those for child pornography
possession, which they determine to be unreasonable and not based on
empirical evidence. But the Court's sentencing jurisprudence has also
made clear that the guidelines should be the starting point for any
sentencing determination. There is also considerable incentive for courts
to impose within-range sentences, since such sentences are generally
entitled to a "presumption of reasonableness" on appellate review.
B. EVOLUTION OF UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINE SECTION 2G2.2
The guideline governing possession and distribution of child
pornography, United States Sentencing Guidelines section 2G2.2, was
first promulgated by the Sentencing Commission in 1987.64 In the past
several years, the section has been amended several times, resulting in
increasingly lengthy sentences.6' These strict penalties result from
amendments that have increased the number and severity of various
sentencing enhancements.66 The current guideline includes enhancements
if any of the following circumstances are established: the material
includes prepubescent children or minors under twelve;6 7 the material
depicts sadistic or masochistic conduct;68 the defendant has exhibited a
"pattern of activity" involving sexual abuse of a minor;" or the offense
59. Id. at 96.
6o. Id. at i09.
61. Id. (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (ioth Cir. 2007) (McConnell, J.,
concurring)).
62. Id. at i lo.
63. See infra notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
64. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, THE HISTORY OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES I (2009),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/research.htm.
65. See TROY STABENOw, DECONSTRUCTING THE MYTH OF CAREFUL STUDY: A PRIMER ON THE
FLAWED PROGRESSION OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES 2-3 (2009), http://www.fd.org/pdf_1ib/
child%20poM%2ojuly%2orevision.pdf.
66. Id. at 3-12.
67. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2G2.2(b)(2) (2oo9).
68. Id. § 2G2.2(b)(4).
69. Id. § 2G2.2(b)(5).
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involved the use of a computer. 0 Additional enhancements apply if the
defendant distributed the material rather than merely possessing it."
Finally, section 2G2.2 allows for escalating enhancements depending on
the number of images possessed." Without any enhancement, the
mandatory minimum for receipt of child pornography is five years."
In a comprehensive analysis of the history of section 2G2.2,
Assistant Federal Public Defender Troy Stabenow examined the
guideline's amendment history and determined that the changes resulted
from "numerous morality earmarks, slipped into larger bills over the last
fifteen years, often without notice, debate, or empirical study of any
kind."74 Stabenow describes how then-Senator Jesse Helms of North
Carolina introduced a "morality earmark" into House Resolution 2622,
the Treasury-Postal Service Appropriations Bill of 199i.' Two religious
organizations, Morality in the Media and the Religious Alliance Against
Pornography, had sent letters to Senator Helms urging him to propose
upward adjustments to the guidelines for child pornography crimes. 6
Accordingly, the proposed amendment instructed the Sentencing
Commission to increase the penalties for child pornography offenders."
The Sentencing Commission lobbied against the upward
adjustments. The chair of the Commission wrote a letter to the House of
Representatives opposing the proposed amendment and noting that it
"would negate the Commission's carefully structured efforts to treat
similar conduct similarly and to provide proportionality among different
grades of seriousness of these offenses."'" The amendment was
nevertheless added to the House bill and was eventually signed into law.79
Stabenow notes that this amendment marked the beginning of a series of
changes to child pornography guidelines that "would come from
Congress [rather than the Sentencing Commission], and would be
dictated not by experience and study, but instead by a general moral
sense that the penalties for 'smut peddlers' should always, and regularly,
be made stricter, not weaker.""o Stabenow then details several more
congressionally mandated increases in the child pornography sentencing
70. Id. § 2G2.2(b)(6).
71. Id. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(A)-(F).
72. Id. § 2G2.2(b)(7)(A)-(D).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(I) (2oo6).
74. STABENOW, supra note 65, at 3.
75. Id. at 6-7.
76. Id. at 6.
77 Id. at 6-7.
78. See Pub. L. No. 102-141, § 632, 105 Stat. 834, 876 (1991); STABENOw, supra note 65, at 7-8.
79. STABENOW, supra note 65, at 8.
So. Id. at 8-9.
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guidelines that were based on moral sensibilities rather than on scientific
studies and empirical research.8
The most far-reaching of these amendments arose in 2003 when two
officials from the Department of Justice convinced freshman
Congressman Tom Feeney to insert changes to the child pornography
guidelines into an unrelated bill." Representative Feeney's amendment
adjusted the sentencing guidelines for child pornography in various ways,
including creating a five-year mandatory minimum and a potential five-
level increase depending on the number of images possessed.8' Debate on
the amendment was limited to twenty minutes, and it was eventually
inserted into the Child Abduction Prevention Act." The Feeney
Amendment was widely criticized for its failure to consult with the
Sentencing Commission and for its lack of empirical support." It was
opposed not only by the Sentencing Commission itself, but also by the
Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, the Judicial
Conference of the United States, and the American Bar Association.86
Professor Steven Chanenson has summarized some of the concerns as
follows:
Congress [for the first time] directly amended the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines by drafting Guidelines text. In the past, Congress often had
been content to issue directions to and requests for study from the
Commission, but left it to the Commission to craft specific Guidelines
text. This time, Congress completely ignored the expert role the
Sentencing Commission was designed to play, cut the Commission out
of the process entirely, and directly wrote Guidelines text to its own
specifications.8'
The politicization of child pornography sentencing guidelines has
resulted in a flawed and irrational sentencing scheme. For example,
Stabenow describes a typical defendant with no criminal history who is
convicted of possessing four short video clips and ten pictures. Since
most of the enhancements are triggered in the average case, the
recommended range for this hypothetical defendant would be 188 to 235
81. Id. at 9-12, 17-26.
82. See Skye Phillips, Protect Downward Departures: Congress and the Executive's Intrusion into
Judicial Independence, 12 J.L. & POL'Y 947, 983-84 (2004); see also id. at 983 n.x85 (noting that Feeney
later admitted he was only the "messenger" for the Department of Justice).
83. STABENOW, supra note 65, at 21, 24-25. Representative Feeney's amendment, commonly
known as the "Feeney Amendment," effected numerous other controversial changes in the federal
sentencing scheme. Most notably, it reduced the ability of judges to invoke downward departures from
the guidelines. See id. at 983; see also Steven L. Chanenson, Hoist with Their Own Petard?, 17 FED.
SENT'G REP. 20, 23 (2004).
84. See Pub. L. No. 108-21, II7 Stat. 650, 667 (2003); Phillips. supra note 82, at 983. 994.
85. See, e.g , STABENOW, supra note 65, at 25-23.
86. Id. at 20.
87. Chanenson, supra note 83, at 23 (footnotes omitted).
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months (roughly fifteen-and-a-half to nineteen-and-a-half years)."
Stabenow compares this sentence to that of a fifty-year-old man who
contacts a twelve-year-old girl over the internet and eventually arranges
a meeting with her during which they have repeated sex. The conduct
would be a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), and the defendant would be
sentenced under section 2G1.3.t His recommended range would be io8
to 135 months (nine to just over eleven years). Stabenow concludes that
this sentencing disparity, between a typical possessor of child
pornography and a man who entices a child to have repeated sex with
him, underscores the disproportionality of section 2G2.2. 9'
III. THE MORAL PANIC VERSUS THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The previous Part discussed the problematic evolution of section
2G2.2. The next Part takes these criticisms a step further. It will first
explain how the guidelines are symptomatic of a nationwide "moral
panic." This panic has prevented the public, and its political
representatives, from carefully considering the empirical evidence that
should inform sentencing decisions. The Part then takes the appropriate
next step by actually investigating the kinds of empirical evidence upon
which the possession guidelines should be based. This empirical review
concludes that studies of pedophiles and child pornography consumers,
as well as data regarding internet use more generally, expose several
deficiencies of section 2G2.2, especially as it applies to defendants with
no prior history of sexual abuse.
A. THE MORAL PANIC OVER CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
As discussed above, the sentencing guidelines for possession of child
pornography have been shaped in recent years by politics and moral
outrage rather than empirical studies. Some commentators have
attributed this pattern to a "moral panic" generated by the media, special
interest groups, law enforcement agencies, and politicians.92 A moral
panic is characterized not only by widespread public fear, but also "fear
88. See STABENOW, supra note 65, at 27-28.
89. Id. at 29.
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. See, e.g., Neil Malamuth & Mark Huppin, Drawing the Line on Virtual Child Pornography:
Bringing the Law in Line with the Research Evidence, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 773, 789
(2007) ("Regrettably, legislative and judicial judgments appear to be regularly based on feeling as
much as fact, and notably without consideration of individual difference factors among pedophiles,
which may serve to better tailor existing laws to external realities."); Michael M. O'Hear, Editor's
Observations, Perpetual Panic, 21 FED. SENT'G REP. 69, 69 (2008); Suzanne Ost, Children at Risk: Legal
and Societal Perceptions of the Potential Threat That the Possession of Child Pornography Poses to
Society, 29 J.L. & Soc'v 436, 443-47 (2002).
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that is wildly exaggerated and wrongly directed."" Such fear-mongering
can in turn produce "excessive and ill-considered legislative responses,
with lawmakers adopting new policies that 'may cause harm in areas
having nothing to do with the original problem and that divert resources
away from measures which might genuinely assist in protecting
children."' 94 In the sex offender context, the moral panic can create a
"ratchet effect" in which subsequent waves of politicians will vote to
increase punishment for offenders." Strict curbs on pedophiles invariably
win votes, and politicians tend to vote for stronger penalties in order to
appear "tough" on sex offenders. 6
Several scholars have argued that there is a moral panic specifically
associated with child pornography. For example, Professor Suzanne Ost
examined British media coverage of child pornography and concluded
that sensationalist headlines and stories on the issue provoke and
reinforce strong public reaction to child pornography crimes.' She
contends that the root causes of the moral panic over child pornography
are the "moral values which affirm the sacred status of the child and the
rights that our society has ascribed to children."98 With regard to
American child pornography laws, Professor Anne Higonnet has
suggested that "[i]t is frightening to question any provisions of child
pornography law because they are so closely bound to the emotionally
explosive issue of actual child abuse."99 Ironically, the strong societal and
legislative responses to this moral panic may actually perpetuate the
fetishizing of children and thus exacerbate the problem of child
molestation.'" Moreover, public opposition to pedophilia may encourage
cohesiveness and support within the targeted group, which could
ultimately encourage pedophilic activity rather than prevent it.'o
93. O'Hear, supra note 92, at 69 (quoting PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF
THE CHILD MOLESTER IN MODERN AMERICA 6-7 (1998)).
94. Id. (quoting JENKINS, supra note 93, at 7).
95. Anonymous, America's Unjust Sex Laws; Illiberal Politics, ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 2oo9, at 9.
96. Id.
97. Ost, supra note 92, at 444.
98. Id. at 443.
99. ANNE HIGONNET, PICTURES OF INNOCENCE: THE HISTORY AND CRISIS OF IDEAL CHILDHOOD I6o
(1998).
00. Ost, supra note 92, at 456-58.
iox. Beech et al., supra note 37. There are certainly scholars and practitioners who believe that the
panic over child pornography is entirely justified. Alexandra Gelber, of the U.S. Department of
Justice, has written that "[t]he heart of a child pornography case is not Victorian-era discomfort with
sex, but the sexual exploitation of children through the ongoing mass circulation of images of their
abuse." Gelber, supra note 34. at I (responding to Mark Hansen, A Reluctant Rebellion. A.B.A. J.,
June 2009, at 54 (Magazine), available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_reluctant_
rebellion!). Similarly, Audrey Rogers has suggested that there is insufficient outrage over the problem
of child pornography possession. See Rogers, supra note 38, at 854-
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Given the moral panic's potential to distort society's understanding
of the harms caused by child pornography, it is important to step back
and "coolly" assess empirical evidence to determine the real dangers
posed by child pornography.' Several scholars have surveyed empirical
studies of child pornography use and have drawn general conclusions
about the appropriateness of child pornography laws, though few have
directly assessed the validity of section 2G2.2." In the next section, I will
conduct a similar, but much narrower, analysis. The following survey of
recent empirical studies aims to assess the validity of section 2G2.2 for
possession defendants with no prior sexual offense history.
B. ONLINE TO OFFLINE "CROSS OVER"
A primary justification for strict sentencing in this area is the
assertion, or at least the insinuation, that possession of child pornography
will lead to actual child molestation.0 4 One critical question, therefore, is
to what extent the possession and viewing of child pornography, by a
defendant with no prior history of sexual offense, has a causal connection
to the likelihood of future contact offenses against children. In other
words, how likely is it that a possessor of child pornography will "cross
over" to contact offenses?05 Numerous recent studies have assessed the
question and most have found that "there is no empirical support for a
1o2. Ost, supra note 92, at 447.
103. See Hessick, supra note 13.
104. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, No. i:o9CRI54, 2o1o U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6o97, at *43
(N.D. Ohio Jan. 26, 2010) ("[E]ven a remote possibility of a correlation between viewing child
pornography and committing a hands-on offense is deeply troubling to the Court."); Michael L.
Bourke & Andres E. Hernandez, The "Butner Study" Redux: A Report of the Incidence of Hands-On
Child Victimization by Child Pornography Offenders, 24 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 183, 189 (2009) ("[W]e
believe that there exists a complex and reciprocal interaction [between viewing child pornography and
contact sexual crimes]."). But cf Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (rejecting the
contention that virtual child pornography could be criminalized because it "whets the appetites of
pedophiles and encourages them to engage in illegal conduct"). Andres Hernandez, whose studies
have frequently been invoked by those who contend there is a causal connection between child
pornography and child sex abuse, recently issued a position paper that noted the "misuse" of his
studies:
Although child pornography crimes are clearly abhorrent and show visual evidence of child
abuse and exploitation, the strong emotional reactions experienced by individuals enforcing
child pornography laws frequently fuel the extreme argument that all of these offenders are
dangerous monsters. Some individuals have misused the results of [Hernandez's prior
studies] to fuel the argument that the majority of [child pornography] offenders are indeed
contact sexual offenders and, therefore, dangerous predators. This simply is not supported
by the scientific evidence.
Andres B. Hernandez, Psychological and Behavioral Characteristics of Child Pornography Offenders
in Treatment 4 (Apr. 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Hastings Law Journal), available
at http://www.iprc.unc.edu/G8/Hernandez.position.paper_.Global Symposium.pdf.
1o5. See Beech et al., supra note 37, at 222-25.
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direct causal link between internet sex offending and the commission of
contact offenses.""' The following is a discussion of several key studies.
The most effective means of assessing cross-over risk is via follow-
up studies, which monitor recidivism rates for those convicted of child
pornography offenses." One of the most recent follow-up studies
monitored 231 internet offenders from 2002 to 2oo8.zos Under a strict
definition of recidivism (which included only actual reconvictions), none
of the subjects were convicted of a hands-on sex offense.' Even under
the broader definition (which included reconvictions, ongoing
investigations, and charges), only two subjects (o.8%) were being
investigated, charged, or were convicted of a hands-on sex offense (i.e.,
child sex abuse).' One of those two subjects had been convicted of a
hands-on offense prior to the follow-up study period."' Given the lengthy
follow-up period (six years), the authors concluded that "[t]he
consumption of child pornography alone does not seem to represent a
risk factor for committing hands-on sex offenses in the present sample-
at least not in those subjects without prior convictions for hands-on sex
offenses.""' The study also assessed the criminal histories of the internet
offenders, and found that "the majority of child pornography consumers
do not have a criminal record for a violent and/or sex offense."" 3
Another follow-up study monitored one group of internet offenders
and one group of child molesters over the course of eighteen months."4
Out of seventy-three internet offenders, none were charged with or
convicted of a contact offense, though one (constituting i%) was
convicted for a nonsexual offense and two (3%) were convicted of
further internet sexual offenses."' Out of 117 convicted child molesters,
2% were convicted of contact sexual offenses, and 17% breached the
conditions of their probation and "were taken back to court or into
custody as a result of inappropriate behavior."" 6 None of the internet
offenders were convicted of a contact sexual offense, nor did any of them
lo6. L. Webb et al., Characteristics of Internet Child Pornography Offenders: A Comparison with
Child Molesters, £9 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 449, 451 (2oo7).
£07. See J6rbme Endrass et al., The Consumption of Internet Child Pornography and Violent and
Sex Offending, 9 BMC PSYCHIATRY, July 14, 2009, http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdfli47i-
244X-9-43.pdf
io8. Id. Just over half of the subjects had been convicted, but the unconvicted remainder had
confessed during court proceedings and had registered (with personal credit cards) at an illegal
website. Id.
io9. Id.
ilo. Id.
i ii. Id.
i 12. Id. at 49.
113. ld. at 48.
£14. Webb et al., supra note lo6, at 452, 455 (describing results of a study of British subjects).
xi5. Id. at 459.
Ix6. Id. at 454-55, 459.
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breach the probation conditions."' Finally, the researchers found that
26% of child molesters demonstrated "sexually risky behavior" as
compared to 14% of internet offenders."8 The researchers concluded that
"child molesters were more likely to fail in all areas compared to the
internet sex offenders" and that "internet offenders appear to be
extremely compliant with community treatment and supervision
sessions.""9 Integrating the results from the follow-up studies with results
from an array of standardized tests designed to assess the risk of
recidivism, the researchers asserted that "by far the largest subgroup of
internet offenders would appear to pose a very low risk of sexual
recidivism..,,1.o
In a 2005 study that monitored 201 child pornography offenders, the
researchers determined the extent and type of recidivism over a two-and-
a-half year period."' The researchers found that, of seventy-six men with
a history of child pornography offenses but no contact offenses, only one
person committed a contact sexual offense during the follow-up period.'
The researchers concluded that their findings "contradict the assumption
that all child pornography offenders are at very high risk to commit
contact sexual offenses involving children.""
Though these follow-up studies are a rebuke to stringent sentencing
for internet offenders, such studies do have limitations. Most problematic
is the "well known fact that the use of criminal records frequently leads
to an underestimation" of actual sex crimes. 4 Many sex offenses that are
investigated or charged do not result in conviction, and some argue that a
high proportion of sex crimes are unreported. 2 5 At least one of the
papers discussed above, by Professor Endrass and his coauthors, sought
to address this problem by using a broader definition of recidivism.6
Other studies supplemented their follow-up analyses with psychological
testing to assess the risk of recidivism.I' Another significant limitation is
the relatively small sample sizes and short follow-up periods of some of
II7. Id. at 459.
I18. Id. at 460. "Sexually risky behaviors," as defined by the researchers, included (i) sexual
convictions, arrests, or charges; (2) "observation of high-risk behaviors" (such as increased internet
use or heavy drinking); and (3) "child protection investigations.' Id. at 455.
i19. Id. at 462.
120. Id. at 463.
121. Michael C. Seto & Angela W. Eke, The Criminal Histories and Later Offending of Child
Pornography Offenders, 17 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 20I, 208 (2005) (describing results of
a study of Canadian subjects).
122. Id. at 207.
123. Id. at 208.
124. Endrass et al., supra note 1o7.
iz25. See, e.g., CTR. FOR SEX OFFENSE MGMT., FACT SHEET: WHAT You NEED To KNow ABouJ SEX
OFFENDERS I (2008), available at http://www.csom.org/pubs/needtoknow fs.pdf.
126. Endrass et al., supra note 107.
127. See, e.g., Webb et al., supra note lo6.
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the studies.' 8 Nevertheless, the findings discussed above were all
statistically significant.
In addition to empirical studies of recidivism, other studies have
focused exclusively on psychological testing, and their findings similarly
undercut the cross-over theory. Professor Ian Elliott and his coauthors
compared the results of extensive psychological testing of a group of
internet offenders and a group of contact offenders.2' The researchers
found that internet offenders had much lower levels of cognitive and
victim empathy distortions than did contact offenders. 30 These
distortions indicate a "greater difficulty identifying the harmful impact of
sexual contact on a child and. . . maladaptive beliefs relating to the
sexual sophistication of children that diminish their ability to display
empathy."' 3' The authors therefore concluded that the lower frequency
of these "pro-offending attitudes and beliefs ... displayed by Internet
offenders" indicates that "they may be unlikely to represent persistent
offenders or potentially progress to commit future contact sexual
offenses."'32
Another psychological meta-study focused on the prevalence of
pedophilia in the male population. Professors Malamuth and Huppin
surveyed studies of male arousal to child pornography, and found that
"sexual interest or arousal in children is not confined to a 'sick few."' 33 In
one such study, 21% of college-aged males "reported some sexual
attraction to small children."' 34 The authors integrated data from several
such studies and concluded that a significant portion of the male
population demonstrates some pedophilic interests.' While it is
disturbing that such a high percentage of men have pedophilic interests,
the finding may be somewhat less alarming given that attraction to
children is not necessarily linked to a desire to commit a contact offense.
Indeed, only 40% to 50% of convicted child molesters meet the
diagnostic classification of pedophilia.3 6 These studies therefore suggest
that a considerable percentage of the men who are aroused by children,
and who thus may consume child pornography, are unlikely to cross over
to contact offenses. Possession of child pornography may instead reflect
128. See, e.g., Seto & Eke, supra note 121, at 209.
129. Ian Alexander Elliott et al., Psychological Profiles of Internet Sexual Offenders: Comparisons
with Contact Sexual Offenders, 21 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 76, 76 (2009).
130. Id. at 87.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Malamuth & Huppin, supra note 92, at 792 (summarizing self-reporting studies as well as
studies measuring physiological indices of penile arousal, by use of a plethysmograph).
134. Id.; see John Briere & Marsha Runtz, University Males' Sexual Interest in Children: Predicting
Potential Indices of "Pedophilia" in a Nonforensic Sample, 13 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 65,71 (1989).
135. Malamuth & Huppin, supra note 92, at 792.
136. Id. at 793.
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a more "general interest in sexual variety"'37 rather than a proclivity
toward child molestation. Professor Ost came to a similar conclusion in a
separate meta-analysis."3 She argued that "it is possible that individuals
use child pornography for sexual stimulation, yet have no inclination to
actually go out and commit child abuse."' 39
These studies expose a serious flaw in the rationale behind strict
sentencing for child pornography. The length of sentences under section
2G2.2 has risen dramatically in the last several years, in part under the
rationale that pornography offenses lead to contact offenses. 40 But many
of those who pushed for these increases provided no scientific basis for
this rationale. 4' The foregoing discussion of cross-over studies indicates
that possession of child pornography, especially among defendants with
no history of contact offenses, is not an accurate predictor of future
incidents of child molestation.
C. INTERNET USE
As discussed above, the legislators who crafted the current version
of section 2G2.2 failed to consult the growing body of research
concerning the cross-over phenomenon. That failure has resulted in
unduly long sentences that are based on unsubstantiated assumptions
about recidivism potential. This section explores a separate set of
questionable assumptions made by the designers of section 2G2.2 about
the basic characteristics of internet use. The child pornography
guidelines provide for sentencing enhancements where the defendant
used a computer, where the defendant "distributed" images, and where
the defendant has possessed a large number of images." Some scholars
have already attacked the computer use enhancement as applying too
frequently and too broadly. 43 I will therefore focus on the infirmities of
the distribution enhancement and the number-of-images enhancements.
.T. The Distribution Enhancement
The primary deficiency of the distribution enhancement is that it is
broad enough to encompass defendants who obtain images via file-
sharing services. The problematic provision is section 2G2.2(b)(3)(B),
which applies a five-level increase if the offense involved "[d]istribution
for the receipt, or expectation of receipt, of a thing of value, but not for
137. Id.
138. Ost, supra note 92, at 449.
139. Id.
140. See supra Part I.
141. See, eg, supra note 85 and accompanying text.
142. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (2009).
'43. See, e.g., STABENow, supra note 65, at 14-15 (noting that in 1996, 97% of child pornography
defendants had used a computer, and that the rationales put forth in support of the enhancement no
longer apply).
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pecuniary gain."'" Several circuit courts have found that this
enhancement applies to defendants using peer-to-peer networks such as
Kazaa and Limewire.145
For example, in United States v. Griffin, the Eighth Circuit found
that the distribution enhancement applied to a defendant who
downloaded approximately sixty-seven illegal video clips from Kazaa.46
The "distribution" prong of the enhancement was satisfied because the
defendant failed to disable the feature that automatically makes the
user s images available to other Kazaa users. 47 The court then found that
the defendant expected to receive a "thing of value" because it
considered the defendant's file-sharing to be a form of "bartering." The
court thus presumed that the defendant had engaged in "distribution"
with the expectation that he would receive additional illegal images in
return." 8 The court accordingly affirmed the district court's finding that
the distribution enhancement applied, and it affirmed the seventy-eight
month (six-and-a-half year) sentence of imprisonment.149
As the Griffin case demonstrates, the distribution provision is stated
broadly enough to trigger the five-level enhancement any time a
defendant has made illegal images available on a file-sharing network.
But similar to the blunt computer use enhancement, the file-sharing
enhancement does not account for the fact that file sharing is now one of
the most common means of accessing files from the internet.5 o Though
file-sharing technology is most commonly associated with the sharing of
copyrightable material,"' recent studies show that "peer-to-peer
technology is increasingly popular for the dissemination of child
pornography."'5 2 Law enforcement has clearly taken notice of this trend,
144. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B).
145. See, e.g., United States v. Carani, 492 F.3d 867, 873-74 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Shaffer, 472 F.3d 1219, 1223-25 (1oth Cir. 2007); United States v. Todd, ioo F. App'x 248, 250 (5th Cir.
2004), vacated, 543 U.S. iio8 (2005).
146. 482 F.3d soo8, 1010, 1013 (2007). But see United States v. Geiner, 498 F.3d 1104, 1II1 (xoth
Cir. 2007) ("[A] defendant who distributes child-pornography files by sharing them on a file-sharing
network does not necessarily do so in exchange for similar files, particularly when the defendant
understands that these files are available even if he chooses not to share his own.").
147. Griffin, 482 F.3d at 1012-13.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1oo9.
150. See Michael P. Murtagh, Note, The FCC, the DMCA, and Why Takedown Notices Are Not
Enough, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 233, 235-36 & n.6, 245 (2009) (compiling and discussing statistics on the
popularity of file-sharing).
151. See id.; see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919-20
(2005).
152. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FILE-SHARING PROGRAMs: PEER-To-PEER NETwoRKs PROVIDE
READY ACCESS TO CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 13 (2003). available at http://www.gao.gov/new.itemsl
do3537t.pdf (describing government studies finding significant amounts of child pornography on
Kazaa, as well as figures from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children indicating that
peer-to-peer services are an increasingly popular means of obtaining child pornography).
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as evidenced by a recent probe targeting the use of peer-to-peer
networks to exchange child pornography.153
Thus the problem with the broad distribution enhancement is not
only that it might encompass file sharing, which arguably does not
involve actual distribution,'54 but also that it will be triggered too
frequently as defendants increasingly turn to these networks for the
purpose of obtaining the images or videos. Once an enhancement
becomes so common that it is triggered in the majority of cases,"' it
ceases to be an "enhancement" at all, but instead constitutes a core part
of the offense. The unfortunate result is that the typical, and least
culpable, child pornography defendant will be sentenced in ranges that
should be reserved for the most serious offenders.
2. The Number-of-Images Enhancements
The staggered enhancements based on number of images possessed
reflect yet another misunderstanding about the nature of internet use. As
with the computer use and distribution enhancements, the number-of-
images enhancements have resulted in lengthy sentences for the least
culpable child pornography offenders.'s The current section 2G2.2
enhancement for number of images requires a two-level increase if the
offense involves over ten images, a three-level increase for over 150
images, a four-level increase for over 300 images, and a five-level
increase for more than 6oo images.' These quantity enhancements were
added to the guidelines in 2003 as part of the much-criticized Feeney
Amendment, discussed above."' Stabenow notes that "[n]o research,
study, body of experience, or rationale, was provided to justify. . . the
choice of the triggering quantities for the two to five point enhancement
related to the number of images."' 59
While there is some validity to the argument that a defendant who
possesses more images of child pornography should endure a longer
sentence, this argument is less tenable in light of the ease with which a
person can download large numbers of images or videos from the
internet. One sentencing judge acknowledged this problem by noting
that "the internet seems analogous to a huge file cabinet containing an
153. Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 55 Charged in Multi-Agency
Agency Probe Targeting Use of Peer-to-Peer Networks To Exchange Child Pornography (Aug. i9,
2oo8), available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/nr/o8o8/o8o8i9losangelesi .htm
154. The question of whether "making available" is the same as "distribution" has spurred
controversy and litigation in the copyright context. See generally Kristy Wiehe, Note, Dollars,
Downloads and Digital Distribution: Is "Making Available" a Copyrighted Work a Violation of the
Author's Distribution Right?, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV 3I7, I1-20 (2008).
155. See supra note 143.
i56. See supra notes 88-9o and accompanying text.
157. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2G2.2(b)(7) (2009).
x58. See supra Part IB.
359. STABENow, supra note 65, at 21.
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almost limitless number of documents and other forms of information.
Under this view, accessing child pornography can be rationalized as
simply pulling out a drawer and simply looking at [a] photo that someone
else took in the past."',o The enhancement also ignores documented
evidence of compulsive and addictive use of the internet."' A recent
article exploring the intersection between child pornography offenders
and internet addiction concludes that voluminous child pornography
downloading may simply be a result of boredom, anxiety, or
depression. Finally, linking length of sentence to number of images has
the illogical consequence of rewarding more sophisticated defendants
who clear their cache memory on a regular basis.'
Supporters of the number-of-images enhancements argue that it is
justified because, though it may be easy to accumulate hundreds of
images, the accumulation is still intentional. 6 4 Punishment, the argument
goes, should not be lessened simply because the crime is easy to
commit.' Judge John Adams, for example, notes that "[r]obbery is
certainly simplified from the criminal's perspective by the use of a
firearm and the choice of a feeble, elderly victim. The guidelines,
however, do not lessen punishment because the crime was easier to
commit.""' But this analogy fails to appreciate the difference between
"culpable" factors that facilitate criminal activity (e.g., victimizing an
elderly person) and "nonculpable" factors that facilitate criminal activity
(e.g., the ability to download images quickly). It is sensible to punish
more severely for the former, but not necessarily for the latter.
In sum, it is quite possible that a defendant will download large
numbers of child pornography images not so much out of a specific
desire to view each and every image, but simply because it is easy to do
so or because of compulsive internet behavior. As another district judge
recently noted, "given the unfortunate ease of access to this type of
16o. United States v. Ontiveros, No. 07-CR-333, 2oo8 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58774, at *17 (E.D. Wis.
July 24, 2oo8).
161. Jerald J. Block, Issues for DSM-V: Internet Addiction, 165 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 3o6, 306 (2oo8)
(arguing that internet addiction is a common disorder and should be included in the DSM-V and
noting that it includes a "sexual preoccupation" subtype).
162. See Ethel Quayle et al., Sex Offenders, Internet Child Abuse Images and Emotional
Avoidance: The Importance of Values, II AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. I, 3-5 (2oo6).
163. Telephone Interview with Troy Stabenow, Assistant Fed. Pub. Defender (Jan. 13, 2010).
Stabenow also argues that punishing a defendant based on the number of images he or she has
accumulated is akin to punishing a habitual marijuana smoker for every marijuana cigarette he or she
has consumed over the past several years. Id.; see also United States v. Kuchinski, 469 F-3d 853, 862
(9th Cir. 2oo6) (noting that most unsophisticated internet users are unfamiliar with the concept of
automatically stored temporary internet files).
164. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, No. r:o 9 CRI 5 4, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6097, at *22
(N.D. Ohio Jan. 26, 2010).
x65. Id.
166. Id. at *22-23.
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material in the computer age, compiling a collection with hundreds of
images is all too easy, yet carries a 5 level enhancement."' In short, the
number-of-images enhancements suffer from the same deficiency as the
computer-use and distribution enhancements: they are based on a
misunderstanding of the basic nature of internet use, which has resulted
in disproportionate sentences for the least culpable child pornography
defendants.
IV. INITIAL MOVEMENT TOWARD REFORM
This Part will review recent calls for reform that have come from the
judiciary and even, perhaps, the Sentencing Commission itself.
Numerous federal judges across the country have sentenced child
pornography defendants below the guideline range.16 It should be noted,
however, that though these particular judges varied from the
recommended guidelines, sentencing courts must still afford considerable
deference to the recommended range. 69 Thus, Congress and the
Sentencing Commission cannot simply rely on sentencing courts to
compensate for the problematic guidelines, but rather, as I argue in this
Note, the guidelines themselves must be amended.
Several recent district court opinions have called into question the
harshness of the sentencing guidelines for possession of child
pornography.'70 In 2008, the non-government-sponsored below-guideline
rate, for section 2G2.2 sentences, was 35.7%."' In contrast, for all
offenders, the non-government-sponsored below-guideline rate was
13.4% .172 In other words, sentencing courts are more likely to depart
from the child pornography guidelines than from other guidelines. Many
of the below-guidelines opinions relied on the Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough
line of cases. 73 Under these cases, and Kimbrough in particular, district
courts may refuse to follow the guideline ranges if they find that the
167. United States v. Hanson, 561 F. Supp. 2d 1004, oo9 (E.D. Wis. 2008).
168. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
169. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46-49 (2007) (explaining that "a district judge must
give serious consideration to the extent of any departure from the Guidelines" and that the
"Guidelines should be the starting point and initial benchmark" for a sentencing decision); Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007) ("[A] court of appeals may apply a presumption of
reasonableness to a. . . proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines.").
170. For a recent survey of such cases, see Ian N. Friedman & Kristina W. Supler, Child
Pornography Sentencing: The Road Here and the Road Ahead, 21 FED. SENT'G REP. 83, 86-88 (2008).
Accord United States v. Grober, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382, 394-97 (D.N.J. 2008); Amir Efrati, Making
Punishments Fit the Most Offensive Crimes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2oo8, at A14.
171. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.28 (2oo8),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2oo8/SBtoco8.htm. The 35.7% figure was obtained by
adding the totals under the "Downward Departure" column and the "Below Range" column, and then
dividing that sum by the total number of sentences imposed under section 2G2.2.
172. Id. tbl.N.
173. See supra Part IA.
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guidelines "do not exemplify the [Sentencing] Commission's exercise of
its characteristic institutional role."' 74
For example, in United States v. Ontiveros, the recommended
guideline range was 97 to 121 months for a defendant convicted of
receiving child pornography.'75 The range was so high in part because of
enhancements for computer use, distribution, and possession of a large
number of images (over 6oo).' The judge disregarded the guidelines,
however, noting the defendant's lack of criminal history, his steady
employment, and his efforts to stop viewing child pornography before
even knowing he was being investigated.'77 The defendant thus did not
"pose a significant threat of re-offending or otherwise endangering the
public," and the five-year (sixty month) mandatory minimum was
deemed sufficient."' Critical to the court's analysis was a finding that
section 2G2.2 does "not reflect the kind of empirical data, national
experience, and independent expertise that are characteristic of the
Commission's institutional role."' 79
Similarly, in United States v. Grober, the defendant's guideline range
was 292 to 365 months (roughly twenty-five to thirty years).o The
sentencing judge asked herself the following question: "Am I working
with a rational sentencing structure, or administering the Code of
Hammurabi?"'"' The court sought to answer the question with an in-
depth hearing on the reasonableness of section 2G2.2, including
testimony from Stabenow and noted sentencinf scholar Douglas
Berman, and it essentially concluded the latter.' 2Judge Katharine
Hayden summarized her findings as follows:
The Court believes as a matter of conscience that the imposition of any
term of incarceration above the mandatory minimum of 6o months
attached to the offenses to which [the defendant] pleaded guilty would
be unfair and unreasonable. In reaching this conclusion, the Courtjoins thoughtful district court judges whose work has convinced them
that the present guideline, § 2G2.2, must be given less deference than
the guidelines traditionally command. The Court's scrutiny of the
guideline has led it to conclude that the guideline does not guide.'83
The judiciary is not alone in recognizing the problems associated
with the child pornography guidelines. Since February 2009, the
174. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 309 (2oo7); see also supra Part II.A.
175. No. 07-CR-333, 2oo8 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58774, at *i (E.D. Wis. July 24, 2oo8).
176. Id. at *2.
177. Id. at *8-io.
178. Id. at *9, 16.
179. Id. at *2o.
18o. 595 F. Supp. 2d 382,386 (D.N.J. 2oo8).
383. Id. at 384. The Code of Hammurabi is an ancient code of laws, created in Babylon in 1760
B.C.E. See THE CODE OF HAMMURABI (L.W. King trans., Kessinger Publ'g 20o4).
182. Grober, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 390-94-
183. Id. at 412.
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Sentencing Commission has held a series of regional public hearings on
federal sentencing policy."' The purpose of the hearings is to solicit
"suggestions regarding changes to the Sentencing Reform Act and other
relevant statutes, the federal sentencing guidelines and policy
statements."'8' Witnesses at several of these hearings-including several
federal judges and United States Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald-have
expressed concerns about the fairness of the child pornography
sentencing scheme." 6 The Commission itself has published a
comprehensive history of the child pornography guidelines.' The
Commission describes the report as "the first step in the Commission's
work" on its consideration of possible amendments to the guidelines for
the amendment cycle ending May I, 2010.m
The rising chorus of concern from district courts, and their decisions
to disregard the guidelines, are important responses to a flawed scheme.
The public hearings and the Commission report on the guidelines are
also promising developments. But sentencing judges still have limited
discretion to vary from the guidelines, and hundreds of defendants are
still being imprisoned under a misguided framework driven by a moral
panic. It is far past time for the Sentencing Commission to reassert itself
in the realm of child pornography and amend section 2G2.2 to better
reflect scientific and empirical data about why people consume child
pornography and what risk these consumers pose to society.
Specifically, the Commission should (i) reduce the guidelines for
possessors of child pornography who have no history of contact offenses,
since studies show that these defendants are at a very low risk of future
contact offenses; (2) narrow the definition of distribution so that it does
not cover mere possession via peer-to-peer file-sharing services; and
(3) recalibrate the enhancements for number of images in light of the
ease with which a defendant can amass a voluminous collection.
CONCLUSION
The production, distribution, and possession of child pornography
are serious crimes that victimize the most vulnerable members of society.
Federal prosecutors are justified in increasing the number of
184. Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, United States Sentencing Commission To Conduct
Regional Public Hearings on Federal Sentencing Policy (Jan. 13, 2009), available at http://
www.ussc.gov/PRESS/rel2009ol13 01.htm.
185. Id.
186. See Statement of Patrick Fitzgerald, U.S. Attorney, Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n,
Regional Hearing on the State of Federal Sentencing at 8-9 (Sept. io, 2009), http://www.ussc.gov/
AGENDAS/2oo9o9o9/Fitzgeraldjtestimony.pdf, see also Lynne Marek, Sentences for Possession of
Child Porn May Be Too High, Judges Say. NAT'L L.J., Sept. to, 2009, http:f/www.1aw.com/jsp/nlj/
PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id= 1202433693658.
i87. See U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, supra note 64.
s88. Id. at i.
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prosecutions for these offenses, and the United States Sentencing
Commission should promulgate strict sentencing guidelines for child
pornography defendants. But, in their haste to condemn these
perpetrators, our elected representatives have crafted blunt sentencing
guidelines based on moral conviction rather than empirical evidence. The
unfortunate result is that the least culpable offenders, including those
with no criminal history, are being sentenced near the upper range of the
guidelines because the typical offender will trigger most of the
enhancements.
This Note reviewed the problematic evolution of these guidelines
and then investigated the type of empirical evidence that should inform
sentences for child pornography offenders. On the critical question of
whether possession of child pornography will lead an offender to "cross
over" to contact offenses, many studies have found no causal connection
between the two. These findings call into serious question one of the
primary rationales behind severe sentences for possessors of child
pornography: that possession leads to molestation.
This Note has also exposed infirmities of specific section 2G2.2
enhancements that are based on a misunderstanding of how the public
uses the internet. First, the guidelines treat a defendant who uses a peer-
to-peer file-sharing service to obtain images as a "distributor," even
though many of these defendants use the service simply to obtain images.
Second, the guidelines place too much weight on the number of images
possessed by a defendant. Given the great ease with which a person can
download hundreds of images with a few clicks, the images
enhancements have become a misleading measure of actual culpability.
Moreover, these enhancements ignore the fact that voluminous
downloading may be a symptom of a more generalized, compulsive use
of the internet.
The sentencing guidelines for possession of child pornography are
not problematic merely because they are, in the abstract, irrational. The
more urgent problem is that criminal defendants are receiving lengthy
sentences, sometimes close to twenty years' imprisonment, that are
disproportionate to the crimes they have committed. The Sentencing
Commission should address this injustice by amending section 2G2.2 in a
way that more accurately reflects the actual culpability of possessors of
child pornography.
May 20IO] 1305
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL1306 [Vol. 61:1281
